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Chapter 1
ONTHE RELIABILITY OF CURRENT GENERATION
NETWORK EAVESDROPPING TOOLS
Eric Cronin, Micah Sherr, and Matt Blaze
Abstract This paper analyzes the problem of interception of Internet traffic from
the eavesdropper’s point of view. We examine the reliability and accu-
racy of transcripts, and show that obtaining “high fidelity” transcripts
is harder than previously assumed. Even in highly favorable situations,
such as capturing unencrypted traffic using standard protocols, simple
– and entirely unilateral – countermeasures are shown to be sufficient to
prevent accurate traffic analysis in many Internet interception config-
urations. In particular, these countermeasures were successful against
every available eavesdropping system we tested. Central to our ap-
proach is a new class of techniques that we call confusion, which, unlike
cryptography or steganography, does not require cooperation by the
communicating parties and, in some case, can be employed entirely by
a third party not involved in the communication at all.
Keywords: eavesdropping, electronic interception, eavesdropping countermeasures
1. Introduction
The results of Internet interceptions are almost always accepted un-
critically. While previous work has shown the potential for spurious
errors [Bel00, BB00] or evasion [PN98, Pax99] to interfere with capture,
there has been remarkably little exploration of the problems which face
an eavesdropper who wishes to ensure the accuracy of their intercepts.
We assert that the task of the eavesdropper is actually far more diffi-
cult than has previously been realized, and show that existing tools are
insufficient to gauge the accuracy of captured traffic.
At least six properties of the Internet protocol stack and architecture
make it difficult for an eavesdropper to accurately reconstruct commu-
nications from its intercepts: decentralized control and heterogeneous
implementations; “best effort” (as opposed to reliable) message deliv-
2ery that allows data to be re-ordered, duplicated or dropped in transit;
shared state and context between communicating parties; dynamic (and
often asymmetric) routing that can change during a flow’s lifetime; lack
of sender and receiver authentication; and ambiguities in protocols, im-
plementations, and configurations.
These properties mean that a great deal of state information is in-
volved in the correct interpretation of any given packet, and this state is
spread across many places, including each of the communicating parties
and the network itself. Without complete knowledge of this state, the
mere presence of a packet somewhere on the network does not automat-
ically imply that it will be accepted by the recipient given in its header,
that it came from the supposed sender, or that it has not been (or will
not be) altered, duplicated, or deleted somewhere along its path.
Any intercept system must take into account these properties (and all
the corresponding state) in order to ensure not only that it is sufficiently
sensitive (that it receives all data exchanged between the targets), but
that it is also sufficiently selective (that it rejects spurious data that
is not actually part of the targets’ exchange) [CSB05a]. The figure of
merit most often considered in judging intercept systems is sensitivity;
adequate selectivity, on the other hand, is generally thought to be easily
achieved by cursory examination of, e.g., packet headers. In fact, selec-
tivity may be a far more difficult problem than most intercept systems
recognize, especially in the presence of deliberate countermeasures.
Fortunately for the eavesdropper, on more benign networks at least,
many of the factors that might introduce uncertainty about the veracity
and interpretation of a given packet are relatively static, at least for the
lifetime of a particular interception. For example, although routes can
theoretically change midstream, in practice, they rarely do, and although
routers and hosts are free to alter, reorder, delay, and duplicate packets,
for the most part they refrain from doing so.
However, this lends a false sense of security to those producing eaves-
dropping tools. Depending on the network configuration, many ambigu-
ities can be intentionally induced, either by one of the communicating
parties or by a third party altogether. In fact, across much of the pro-
tocol stack, from the physical layer to the applications, it is surprisingly
simple to introduce data that appears entirely valid but that might not
be received and processed by the purported recipient. The Internet ap-
pears almost to have been designed to maximize uncertainty from the
point of view of those eavesdropping on it.
In particular, we observe that a single party, which we call a con-
fuser, can introduce traffic directed at an eavesdropper but that is never
actually received (or if received, is rejected) by the ostensible recipi-
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ent. Depending on the eavesdropper’s configuration and its position in
the network, this traffic can be made indistinguishable from legitimate
traffic. In the presence of sufficient confusion, an eavesdropper may be
able to be made arbitrarily uncertain as to whether a given intercepted
message was real or spurious.
Let us introduce some terminology that will be used throughout the
remainder of this paper. As is customary, Alice and Bob will represent
our network communicators. Alice will often be a source while Bob will
be a sink (although, of course, in most protocols the roles are symmetric
and often alternating). Eve will be our eavesdropper. An interception
system is vulnerable to confusion if it captures and records in its tran-
scripts messages purportedly from Alice to Bob but that are rejected or
otherwise not processed by Bob.
Although we do not advocate that confusion be used as a general
confidentiality technique, we briefly note that confusion has some inter-
esting qualities that make it particularly attractive as an eavesdropping
countermeasure.
While cryptography is typically used in a manner that ensures the
confidentiality only of message payloads, confusion protects both
a message’s contents and metadata. It may therefore be advan-
tageous to combine confusion with encryption to mask signaling
information as well as content.
Since confusion is transparent to Bob, it may be easily incorpo-
rated into existing protocols. Thus, it may be particularly useful
when legacy applications and protocols cannot be easily upgraded
or replaced.
If the confuser is a third-party, then neither Alice nor Bob needs
to be aware of the confusion. Unlike bilateral techniques in which
it is obvious that Alice and Bob have colluded to disguise their
messages, confusion allows Alice and Bob to deny that they even
attempted to communicate privately.
2. Related Work
There has been little prior work investigating the general problem
of traffic interception from the eavesdropper’s point of view [Bel00,
BB00, CSB05b]. However, considerable research has addressed the re-
lated (but not identical) topic of information privacy. Cryptography,
steganography, subliminal or covert channels [Sim83], winnowing and
chaffing [Riv98], quantum communication [BBB+90], and anonymous
4communications [DMS04, RR98], for example, all focus on establishing
confidential communication.
Work from the eavesdropper’s point of view has primarily been limited
to the specialized subtopic of intrusion detection [SP03, PP03, Pax99].
In a network intrusion detection system (NIDS), the primary goal of
the listener (eavesdropper) is real-time analysis of incoming traffic to
recognize attack signatures and detect anomalies. These systems are
deployed at the borders of controlled networks where it becomes much
easier to make assumptions about the machines within the network that
the system protects. Additionally, the communication patterns of an
attacker are also unique compared to general bidirectional communica-
tions (hence the NIDS is able to flag suspicious traffic). However, unlike
a NIDS, a general purpose eavesdropper must process all traffic, both
normal and anomalous. Because of these differences, we may draw from
work on NIDS, but their applicability is limited by the different con-
straints on topology and communication characteristics.
3. Confusion in the Internet Architecture
By design, the Internet is a very heterogeneous system. Machines of
differing hardware and software configurations communicate and inter-
operate through the use of standard protocols. However, ambiguities
in implementations, configurations, and protocol specifications create
the opportunity for non-uniformity in the processing of specially crafted
messages. Confusion exploits these inconsistencies by forcing the eaves-
dropper to consider multiple plausible interpretations of its transcripts.
The IP and TCP specifications (which famously advise “be conservative
in what you do, be liberal in what you accept from others. [Pos81]”)
thus aggravate the problem of proper selectivity by recommending that
implementations accept even outlier communications.
Below, we explore various vectors and techniques for injecting con-
fusion in the Internet architecture. The confusion countermeasures are
not intended to be exhaustive; rather, their purpose is to illustrate the
ease and effectiveness at which reliable interception can be defeated.
3.1 Physical Layer Confusion
At the physical layer, network devices convert analog signals into dig-
ital encodings. To allow interoperable devices, standards exist that
define acceptable ranges for amplitudes, frequencies, voltages, and so
forth [IEE85, IEE90, IEE97]. However, because transmission and decod-
ing are analog processes, for any given parameter (frequency, amplitude,
etc.), no two decoders will use precisely the same threshold to determine
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Figure 1. Left: An eavesdropping topology in which all parties communicate via the
same shared bus. Right: A configuration in which Eve is located on the network
between Alice and Bob.
whether a given signal is accepted or rejected. Thus, network devices,
particularly commodity hardware, do not strictly abide by these stan-
dards and often interpret messages sent outside of the specified ranges.
Alice can exploit these differences to evade as well as confuse Eve.
As depicted in Figure 1 (left), we assume a topology in which all parties
share the same communication medium (e.g., a common bus or a wireless
network). To evade Eve, Alice can transmit messages at a frequency, am-
plitude, or voltage that is imperceptible to Eve but acceptable by Bob.
(Note that this type of physical evasion is more difficult when Alice, Bob,
and Eve do not share a communication medium, as intermediary routers
act as normalizers and reduce the likelihood of an effective evasion at-
tack.) Generally, if Eve is less sensitive than Bob and the three parties
share a communication medium, then Eve is susceptible to evasion.
Eve’s obvious counter-countermeasure (i.e., enhancing her sensitiv-
ity) has the unfortunate effect of increasing her vulnerability to confu-
sion [CSB05a]. If Eve is more sensitive than Bob, evasion is not possible.
However, a third-party confuser can now inject noise that is processed by
Eve but ignored by Bob. As a result, Eve is forced to consider multiple
interpretations, while Bob only sees the legitimate messages.
3.2 Link Layer Confusion
Confusion is possible at the link layer if the confuser and Eve share the
same Ethernet. A typical example of such a topology is an unencrypted
802.11 network in which Eve “sniffs” wireless transmissions.
As we show empirically in Section 1.4, current eavesdropping systems
suffer from inadequate selectivity. Although most eavesdropping sys-
tems are capable of recording traffic at the link layer, they often ignore
Ethernet frames and instead process messages at either the network or
transport layer. By crafting Ethernet frames with invalid MAC destina-
6tion addresses, a confuser can inject noise that is processed by Eve but
fails to be delivered to Bob [PN98]. Neither Bob nor the local gateway
will process the noise since their operating systems silently discard Eth-
ernet frames whose MAC addresses do not match that of the network
interface.
This technique is obviously only effective when Eve has poor selec-
tivity. If Eve examined the Ethernet frames, she would be capable of
distinguishing the noise from the message text. Unlike other confusion
countermeasures, the MAC technique is not indicative of a fundamental
limitation of electronic eavesdropping. However, the significance of the
approach is that it illustrates the dangers of inadequate selectivity: An
eavesdropping system that fails to properly process Ethernet frames is
inherently vulnerable to this form of confusion. Accordingly, an Internet
eavesdropping system that observes traffic on a local Ethernet cannot
claim to be reliable unless it both intercepts and processes link layer
headers.
3.3 Network Layer Confusion
If Eve intercepts a packet on the path from Alice and Bob (see Fig-
ure 1, right), she must carefully examine the packet’s IP header to form
an opinion as to whether the packet is deliverable. There are several rea-
sons that a packet may fail to be delivered: the packet’s checksum may
be incorrect, IP options may be specified that are unsupported by an
intermediary router (e.g., source routing), the packet’s size may exceed
a hop’s MTU, or the initial time-to-live (TTL) value may be insufficient
to reach Bob [Pos81, PN98]. If the confuser has more knowledge about
the network than Eve, he can inject noise that will be dropped either
before reaching Bob or by Bob’s IP implementation. If Eve processes
all intercepted IP packets (which, as we show in Section 1.4, is the case
with all tested eavesdropping systems), then she will interpret the noise
along with the legitimate traffic.
As with the link layer techniques, the network layer confusion coun-
termeasures highlight weaknesses in current eavesdropping systems. By
enhancing Eve’s selectivity, many of these countermeasures can be elim-
inated. However, an eavesdropper that either does not examine IP head-
ers or lacks sufficient selectivity to determine whether packets are deliv-
erable is inherently vulnerable to this type of confusion.
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Open Source Eavesdropping Tools
Bro: Bro is a network intrusion detection system developed at the University of California,
Berkeley. As such, it does not operate as an eavesdropping tool by default. However, it
has a very robust stream reconstruction engine, and can be cajoled into acting as an oﬄine
analysis tool. We ran Bro using the ‘weird’, ‘conn’, ‘contents’, ‘frag’, and ‘smtp’ policies
using their default settings. Bro can be found at http://www.bro-ids.org.
Chaosreader: Chaosreader is a user-friendly TCP reconstruction tool which cre-
ates HTML pages for the contents of intercepted sessions. It can be found at http:
//chaosreader.sourceforge.net.
Ethereal: Ethereal is a very popular eavesdropping tool. Although most of its features are
packet oriented, it contains a TCP reassembly option which was used for the experiments.
Ethereal can be found at http://www.ethereal.com/.
Snort: Snort is another commonly used NIDS. We ran it in oﬄine mode using the stream4
and stream4 reassemble preprocessors with the log flushed streams option. In addition, we
used the snort-replay patch, which uses its own stream reconstruction implementation.
Snort can be found at http://www.snort.org/, and snort-replay at http://www.algonet.se/
∼nitzer/snort-replay/.
tcpick: tcpick is a pcap-based packet sniffer and TCP reconstruction tool. It can be
found at http://tcpick.sourceforge.net/.
tcptrace: tcptrace is an analysis tool for pcap-based network intercepts. Among its
many features, tcptrace can reconstruct captured TCP streams. It can be found at http:
//jarok.cs.ohiou.edu/software/tcptrace/tcptrace.html.
tcpflow: tcpflow is a useful tool for conducting TCP stream reassembly. It operates by
processing pcap dump files and extracting the contents of TCP streams. It can be found
at http://www.circlemud.org/∼jelson/software/tcpflow/.
Commercial Eavesdropping Tools
CommView: CommView is a commercial Windows eavesdropping tool. An evaluation
version can be found at http://www.tamos.com/products/commview/.
NetworkActiv PIAFCTM: PIAFCTM is a commercial Windows eavesdropping tool.
A trial version is available at http://www.networkactiv.com/PIAFCTM.html.
Sniffem: Sniffem is a commercial Windows eavesdropping tool. A trial version is available
at http://www.sniff-em.com/sniffem.shtml.
Figure 2. Eavesdropping software evaluated
4. Failure of Current Eavesdropping Systems
In this section we examine common tools for eavesdropping in several
domains, and show how they fall vulnerable to simple, unilateral attacks.
We look at both digital and analog examples.
4.1 Digital eavesdropping evasion
To demonstrate the susceptibility of current eavesdropping tools to
confusion, we implemented the MAC and TTL confusion techniques de-
scribed in Section 1.3 and originally introduced as NIDS attacks in [PN98].
8Figure 3. Top: Legitimate message received by the SMTP server (Bob) and the
intended email recipient. Bottom: An eavesdropping system’s (Ethereal) reconstruc-
tion in which Eve not only fails to capture Alice’s message, she also perceives the
covertext as the legitimate message.
(Fragroute [Son99] also provides an implementation of the NIDS tech-
niques, but it was found to be unsuitable for general purpose bidirec-
tional communication.) The MAC approach relies on generating noise
with invalid MAC destination addresses. While Eve will process the
noise, the local gateway will not route such packets since it only accepts
correctly addressed Ethernet frames. In the TTL technique, the confuser
introduces noise with TTLs that are sufficient to reach Eve but not Bob.
Note that both techniques can be trivially defeated by providing ade-
quate selectivity. Here, our aim is not to introduce formidable counter-
measures. Rather, we show that the current generation of eavesdropping
tools are highly susceptible to even these weak forms of confusion.
In our experiments, Alice transmits an email via SMTP to our in-
stitution’s email server (Bob). To confuse Eve, Alice (functioning as
the confuser) injects spurious noise using either the MAC or the TTL
confusion techniques. To maximize confusion, Alice sends both the le-
gitimate email and the noise in byte-sized packets (recall that since TCP
is stream based, applications that rely on TCP are generally unaffected
by the size of the transmitted packets). For every byte of legitimate
text, Alice sends eight noise packets. Of the eight noise streams, the
first is comprised of a “cover message”. This first stream, although com-
posed of noise, constitutes a false but sensible message (a passage from
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Dickens’ “A Tale of Two Cities” [Dic59]). The remaining seven streams
of noise consist of random characters. In an attempt to cause Eve to
interpret the false stream rather than her true message, Alice always
sends the false stream first, followed by a random intermixing of the le-
gitimate stream and the seven random noise streams. No modifications
were made to the SMTP server (Bob).
We tested our link and network layer confusion tools against 11 eaves-
dropping systems, ranging from commercial applications to free open-
source toolkits (descriptions of the eavesdropping systems are provided
in Figure 2). Experiments were conducted on a testbed network in
which Alice and Eve reside on the same local subnet. From this subnet,
a minimum TTL of five is required to reach Bob. Both Alice and Eve
are Pentium servers with 3COM Fast EtherLink XL 100MB/s network
cards and are connected via a 100MB/s switch.
The performance of the eavesdroppers in the presence of confusion was
startlingly lacking. Figure 4 describes Eve’s (in)ability to reliably recon-
struct the email messages. Although all but one eavesdropping packages
were able to correctly reconstruct Alice’s message in the absence of con-
fusion, all tested systems failed to interpret her message once either of
the two confusion techniques was applied. Anomalies were reported only
by 18% of the eavesdroppers with the MAC-based approach and 27% of
the systems when TTL confusion was used. Moreover, the cover message
was perceived as the email in 45% of the cases when either technique
was utilized (see Figure 3). In all cases, the email server (Bob) correctly
received Alice’s communication and delivered the email to its intended
recipient.
4.2 POTS Evasion and Confusion
Confusion and evasion can be practical threats to digital Internet
eavesdropping, and indeed, such systems are the focus of this paper.
However, similar techniques can also be applied to analog networks, espe-
cially when analog to digital conversion is performed (see Section 1.3.1).
For a simple example, we consider voice telephone signaling between the
subscriber and the switch.
Analog telephone service, also known as “plain old telephone ser-
vice” (POTS), uses analog touch-tones to signal the caller’s desired
number. The touch-tone system is an international standard known as
DTMF [Int88], followed by both telecommunications equipment manu-
facturers and the telephone network to ensure compatibility. Each of the
16 DTMF digits is comprised of two base frequencies. The specification
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lists acceptable ranges for tone duration, spacing, frequency, amplitude,
and twist (relative amplitude of the high and low frequencies).
Constructing a decoder for DTMF signals which exactly follows these
specifications turns out to be surprisingly difficult and expensive. In-
stead, most decoders relax the tolerances in one or more of the dimen-
sions of the standard, accepting tones which are a little too loud or quiet,
or a little out of pitch, etc. Since each decoder has a unique range of ac-
ceptable tones, it is possible to construct out-of-specification tones that
some decoders will see but others will miss. Using this knowledge, it is
possible to both evade and confuse an eavesdropper.
To test the practicality of this countermeasure, we constructed a sim-
ulated phone network in our lab. A Teltone TLS-5 Telephone Line Sim-
ulator was used as the central office, providing dialtone and four phone
lines with unique phone numbers, as well as DTMF switching to con-
nect calls between lines. Alice, the call initiator, was an Ameritec AM8a
PCM/VF call analyzer with an ordinary POTS handset connected, Bob
was a second POTS handset, and Eve was a Metrotel VNA 70a DTMF
decoder.
Among its many features, the AM8a call analyzer used by Alice allows
DTMF codes to be generated with very precise and configurable param-
eters. For our experiments, we focused on two variables: the frequency
and amplitude of the higher of the two DTMF frequencies. Through
binary search, settings which allowed for both evasion and confusion
were discovered. Evasion can be applied by decreasing the amplitude
of the higher frequency. At -39dBm, the central office still correctly
decodes Alice’s signal and completes the call, while the eavesdropper
records nothing. Similarly, if instead the high frequency is increased by
3Hz the central office no longer recognizes Alice’s touch-tones, but the
eavesdropper records them as having been dialed. Using Alice’s handset
in coordination with the AM8a, the legitimate number can be dialed
interspersed with out-of-range digits to provide confusion. In addition,
although we did not test the scenario, by combining both techniques its
is clear that Alice could drive Eve to a specific false phone number.
This experiment highlights the challenges which face an eavesdrop-
per when positioned too close to the sender. Limited sensitivity and
imperfect selectivity make it susceptible to both evasion and confusion
countermeasures. While Eve may be certain that intercepts originate
from Alice, she cannot be certain of where in the telephone network
they terminate. A far more reliable form of dialed number recording is
therefore achieved through analysis of call detail records generated by
the switch itself, but this is, of course, not surreptitious with respect
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to the operators of the switch. Confusion as a telephone wiretapping
countermeasure is studied in more detail in [SCCB05].
5. Improving Eavesdropping Reliability
The experiments described in the previous section show how unilat-
eral countermeasures can reduce the reliability of eavesdropping systems.
In this section, we explore methods to improve eavesdropping tools’ re-
silience to such countermeasures.
5.1 Enhancing Sensitivity
To reduce her susceptibility to evasion, Eve can improve her sensitiv-
ity. This implies recording at the lowest possible OSI layer, and record-
ing everything available (even data that appears to be erroneous). Any
action that could have been performed automatically by lower layers,
such as discarding corrupt packets, can be carefully emulated by Eve in
a more selective manner.
Unfortunately, this advice may be hard to follow. For example, many
authorized uses of eavesdropping in the United States operate under
strict limitations on what can be recorded to prevent traffic of those not
under suspicion from being observed. In such environments the steps
Eve can take to improve sensitivity are reduced.
5.2 Enhancing Confusion Detection and
Eavesdropper Selectivity
In some situations, confusion may be made ineffective by deploying
confusion-aware eavesdroppers. For example, the MAC confusion tech-
nique described in Section 1.3 can be defeated with improved software.
By enhancing her sensitivity, Eve may be able to better identify and filter
the noise, thereby improving her reliability. However, if Eve is careless in
her selections and ignores packets with covert information, she provides
Alice and Bob with an unmonitored communication channel.
5.3 Active Eavesdropping
Confusion is only possible when there is an asymmetry in knowledge
between Eve and the confuser. To inject uncertainty in Eve’s transcripts,
the confuser exploits his knowledge (e.g., the network topology or Bob’s
TCP/IP stack configuration) to ensure that the noise will be removed
or filtered before being processed by Bob. If Eve can also acquire this
knowledge, then she can apply the same filter and can therefore trivially
defeat confusion.
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The intuitive solution to constructing a confusion-resistant eavesdrop-
per is to make Eve active. In addition to passively observing traffic, an
active eavesdropper attempts to learn more about the network and the
communicating parties by sending out probes. For example, an active
eavesdropper can counter the TTL confusion technique described in Sec-
tion 1.3 by counting the number of network hops between itself and Bob.
By acquiring additional knowledge, Eve can improve her selectivity and
overall reliability.
Unfortunately, active eavesdropping is not always sufficient to ensure
reliable reconstruction of the intercepted traffic. First, the probes used
by an active Eve can themselves be subjected to a form of confusion. As
a counter-counter-countermeasure, a confuser can inject a number of fake
responses to Eve’s probes. Returning to the TTL confusion example, a
confuser can transmit fake ICMP TTL-exceeded messages to frustrate
Eve’s ability to discern the true TTL cutoff. Second, if Eve actively
transmits probes, she may reveal her presence to Alice, Bob, and/or the
confuser. Since eavesdropping is usually meant to be clandestine, active
eavesdropping may be inappropriate for many situations.
5.4 Improving Reliability through Eavesdropper
Placement
The location of Eve in the network topology may affect her resilience
to confusion. An intuitive approach is to position her in close proximity
to Alice. The ability of distant third-party confusers to inject noise is
thus diminished as Eve can better discern Alice’s communications from
those of a distant forger. Unfortunately, this strategy is ineffective when
Alice functions as the confuser. Unless Eve can determine which of
Alice’s messages are authentic, her position does little to improve her
reliability.
A better solution is to place Eve as close as possible to Bob (and
henceforth as far as possible from any confusers). For example, the
TTL confusion technique will be ineffective if Bob and Eve reside on
the same local network. A disadvantage of this approach is that Eve
can only make reliable claims about the messages received by Bob. Her
distance from Alice may make the authenticity of intercepted messages
harder to establish.
A more ideal strategy is to deploy a number of collaborating eaves-
droppers throughout the network. By comparing messages intercepted
near the sender versus the receiver, Eve may be able to remove likely
noise and improve her reliability. We leave the analysis of colluding
eavesdropping as a future research direction.
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6. Conclusion
For electronic wiretapping systems to be reliable, they must exhibit
correct behavior with regard to both sensitivity and selectivity. Since
capturing traffic is a requisite of any monitoring system, considerable
research has focused on preventing evasion attacks and otherwise im-
proving sensitivity. However, little attention has been paid to enhancing
selectivity or even recognizing the issue in the Internet context.
Traditional wisdom has held that eavesdropping is sufficiently reliable
as long as the communicating parties do not participate in a bilateral
effort to conceal their messages. We have demonstrated that even in the
absence of cooperation between the communicating endpoints, reliable
Internet eavesdropping is more difficult than simply capturing packets.
If an eavesdropper cannot definitively and correctly select the pertinent
messages from the captured traffic, the validity of the reconstructed
conversation can be called into question. By injecting noise into the
communication channel, unilateral or third-party confusion can make
the selectivity process much more difficult, diminishing the reliability of
electronic eavesdropping.
Whether eavesdropping can be performed reliably and confusion cor-
rectly detected and rejected on the Internet depends heavily on the spe-
cific interception topology and on the locations of potential sources of
confusion traffic. Even in those configurations where confusion can the-
oretically be filtered out, the eavesdropping software itself may still be
susceptible to confusion, and, in fact, current software appears to be
especially vulnerable to even the simplest confusion techniques.
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No Confusion (1B pkts) MAC Confusion TTL Confusion
Software Inter-
pretation
Detected
Anoma-
lies
Inter-
pretation
Detected
Anoma-
lies
Inter-
pretation
Detected
Anoma-
lies
bro Success None re-
ported
Failure
(Cover-
text)
Retrans.
inconsis-
tency
Failure
(Cover-
text)
Retrans.
inconsis-
tency
chaosreader Success None re-
ported
Failure
(Ran-
dom
noise)
None
reported
Failure
(Ran-
dom
noise)
None
reported
CommView
Eval. Ver-
sion
Success None re-
ported
Failure
(Cover-
text)
None
reported
Failure
(Cover-
text)
None
reported
ethereal Success None re-
ported
Failure
(Cover-
text)
None
reported
Failure
(Cover-
text)
None
reported
Network-
Activ
PI-
AFCTM
Success None re-
ported
Failure
(Cover-
text)
None
reported
Failure
(Cover-
text)
None
reported
Sniffem Failure
(Ran-
dom
noise)
None re-
ported
Failure
(Ran-
dom
noise)
None
reported
Failure
(Ran-
dom
noise)
None
reported
snort-
replay
Success None re-
ported
Failure
(Ran-
dom
noise)
None
reported
Failure
(Ran-
dom
noise)
None
reported
snort-
stream4
Success None re-
ported
Failure
(Ran-
dom
Noise)
None
reported
Failure
(Ran-
dom
Noise)
TTL
Exceeded
tcpick Success None re-
ported
Failure
(Cover-
text)
None
reported
Failure
(Cover-
text)
None
reported
tcptrace Success None re-
ported
Failure
(Ran-
dom
noise)
TCP
DUPs
detected
Failure
(Ran-
dom
noise)
TCP
DUPs
detected
tcpflow Success None re-
ported
Failure
(Ran-
dom
noise)
None
reported
Failure
(Ran-
dom
noise)
None
reported
Success - The eavesdropping application correctly interpreted the messagetext.
Failure (Covertext) - The eavesdropping application incorrectly interpreted the covertext as the
legitimate messagetext. See Figure 3.
Failure (Random noise) - No discernible English text could be obtained from the eavesdropper’s
interpretation.
Figure 4. Ineffectiveness of various eavesdropping software against confusion tech-
niques.
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